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Conditional cooperation in group contests

dc.contributor.authorJános Kiss, Hubert
dc.contributor.authorRosa García, Alfonso
dc.contributor.authorZhukova, Vita
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-23T09:47:18Z
dc.date.available2025-06-23T09:47:18Z
dc.date.issued2020-12-23
dc.identifier.citationKiss, H. J., Rosa-Garcia, A., & Zhukova, V. (2020). Conditional cooperation in group contests. Plos one, 15(12), e0244152.es
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10952/9742
dc.descriptionThe paper explores how conditional cooperation—the tendency of individuals to match the contributions of others—manifests in competitive group settings. Using an experimental framework, the authors analyze behavior in group contests where success depends partly on the collective effort. The study identifies that cooperation is influenced by group outcomes: it persists when groups win or outperform others but declines in underperforming, losing groups. These behavioral patterns are validated through a random-effects linear panel regression that accounts for a broad set of control variables, providing robust empirical support for the conclusions.es
dc.description.abstractThis study demonstrates experimentally that conditional cooperation, commonly observed in public goods provision, also occurs in group contests where individual contributions affect the group's chance of winning. The results show that conditional cooperation is evident in winning groups and those that outperform rivals, even if they lose. However, it disappears in losing groups with poor performance. A panel regression analysis supports these findings.es
dc.language.isoenes
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectConditional cooperationes
dc.subjectGroup contestses
dc.subjectPublic goodses
dc.subjectCollective actiones
dc.subjectExperimental economicses
dc.subjectBehavioral economicses
dc.titleConditional cooperation in group contestses
dc.typejournal articlees
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses
dc.journal.titlePLOS ONEes
dc.volume.number15es
dc.issue.number12es
dc.description.disciplineCiencias de la Comunicaciónes
dc.identifier.doi10.1371/journal.pone.0244152es
dc.description.facultyEconomía y Empresaes


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